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PROFESSOR Davis' treatise has been so widely and justly acclaimed that it
would be superfluous, at this late date, to attempt to add anything substantial
to that evaluation. It may not, however, be entirely out of place to consider a
few major themes of the treatise in the light of what is sometimes called the
current phase or crisis in American administrative law.1 It is somewhat ironic
that so soon after the publication of these beautifully written and impressive
volumes, the administrative process should again be on the defensive. Of course
this is not to suggest that Professor Davis, as one of the foremost defenders
of the administrative process, is somehow to blame for the troubles reflected,
for example, in Dean Landis' Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-
Elect,2 and more recently in the President's message to Congress of April 13,
1961.3 Quite the contrary, a good deal of Professor Davis' energy has been
devoted to warning against just such over "judicialization" of the administra-
tive process as Dean Landis suggests may be partly responsible for present in-
adequacies of the regulatory agencies. 4 It is therefore these aspects of the
treatise to which this discussion will be devoted.
Fundamental to any consideration of the "judicialization" of administrative
procedures-using the term simply as shorthand for a host of subordinate
problems, without suggesting either approbation or disapproval-is the ques-
tion of when "a quasi-judicial," or "trial-type" hearing is required. Professor
Davis prefers the last term; the Administrative Procedure Act uses "on the
1. See Landis, The Administrative Process: The Third Decade, 47 A.B.A.J. 135
(1961) ; Kintner, Federal Administrative Law in the Decade of the Sixties (pts. 1-2), 47
A.B.A.J. 269, 366 (1961). Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from a Federal Trade
Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. REv. 199 (1960).
2. SUBCOMns. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMMs. ON THE
JUDIcIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as LANDIS REPORT].
3. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1961, p. 12, col. 1.
4. Very recently suggestions have been advanced that due to modern techniques for
the assemblage of facts, the older "judicialized" forms may well be supplanted. The
exact technology applicable to such a process has not as yet been clearly articulated.
But if judgments of regulatory agencies in many fields such as rates are, in truth,
business judgments rather than judgments conforming to a legal theory, techniques
which do not rest upon the tedious process of examination and cross-examination
and which underlie honest business judgments made by the industries may have a
value in the handling of substantially the same problem by the agencies.
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record" with similar connotations. The Treatise devotes one of its fullest chap-
ters to this problem,5 and understandably it emphasizes an analysis of the
cases concerned with the constitutional requirement of such a hearing-in
effect the requirement of due process. On this point Professor Davis' principal
thesis is that the courts have frequently gone astray by answering right to hear-
ing questions in terms of the function being performed-the grant or denial of
a license, the establishment of a rate, or the issuance of a cease and desist order
-instead of in terms of the kind of factual issues, if any, being resolved. For
example, when there is no factual issue in dispute, he quite incontrovertibly
points out that a trial-type hearing is unnecessary. This does not rule out the
possibility, as Davis apparently recognizes, that there may nevertheless be a
right, constitutional or statutory, to have the decision made on the record of
admitted facts, and also to have opportunity for argument with respect to their
significance. The distinction which he next advances is more difficult to apply.
Davis contrasts adjudicative facts-issues which require a trial-type hearing-
with legislative facts-those which may be determined on the basis of the
agency's general knowledge or through whatever investigative techniques may
be prescribed by the legislature or considered appropriate by the agency.
Adjudicative facts are facts about the parties and their activities, busi-
nesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of
who did what, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative
facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legis-
lative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general
facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and dis-
cretion.0
Apart from the rather circular nature of this distinction-since it takes us
back to the ultimate question of law or policy to be decided-in actual applica-
tion it is as elusive as all the other magic keys which have been offered for the
solution of the right to hearing problem. Suppose, for example, that the issue
is whether a general rate increase should be allowed for the major railroads in
the United States, a recurring problem before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. The factual issues concern the expenses, earnings, actual and probable
tonnages, financial structures, and capital needs of all the railroads. In one
sense these are facts pertaining to the immediate parties, since all the railroads
are parties to the proceedings and will be directly affected by the order. In
another sense they are general facts pertaining at least to an entire industry,
and in some aspects to competing industries, to consumers and to the entire
economy. In part they help the Commission determine questions of policy and
discretion regarding the wisdom of a rate increase, but they also help determine
the financial needs of the particular roads. As a matter of practice, these deter-
minations are of course made by the Commission in trial-type hearings, al-
though the Commission may take official notice of general economic data and
5. Vol. 1, ch. 7.
6. Vol. 1, § 7.02 at 413.
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the voluminous information reported to it by the carriers. Conceivably, these
determinations could be made in a general rule making proceeding, with notice
of the proposed action and opportunity to submit views and data, as provided
for in section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. This view has been
adopted, at least partially, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
with respect to the regulation of insurance rates,7 and by some state courts
with respect to prescription of prices for several industries such as dairy pro-
duction.8 Representatives of the Bureau of the Budget in hearings before the
Carroll Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure also accepted
this view when they suggested that the procedure for rate-making should "be
more a hearing of the character of a legislative hearing, rate-making being a
legislative process rather than a trial in the sense in which the formal proceed-
ing is now carried out."9 Professor Davis does not undertake to predict, on the
basis of the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, whether such
a rule making proceeding would be acceptable to the United States Supreme
Court; he apparently believes, however, that some factual issues in rate-making
proceedings may require trial-type hearings while others do not.10
Whatever may be the difficulties in applying the distinctions between ad-
judicative and legislative facts, or between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
functions, for the purpose of determining constitutional requirements, a policy
question would remain as to the desirability of substituting more informal pro-
cedures for the present trial-type or on-the-record proceedings generally used
for rate determinations, issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity,
and the like. In this connection it is perhaps worth recalling that the early
struggles of the administrative process in the United States were directed
against a crippling judicial review which insisted, also in the name of due
process, that some degree of independent judicial judgment should be accorded
to key facts upon which substantive constitutional rights were supposed to
depend. Partly to provide an administrative record which would make un-
necessary a judicial trial de novo, and partly to assure fairness in the adminis-
trative determination so as to obviate the need for an independent judicial
judgment on factual issues, the elaborate quasi-judicial administrative hear-
ing was developed. Since the restriction upon judicial review and the emphasis
upon the quasi-judicial administrative hearing largely grew up together, with-
out explicit legislative prescription of either, it is practically impossible to say
which was cause and which effect. The Interstate Commerce Act, for example,
in providing for rate determinations by the ICC and judicial review by the
federal district courts, failed to prescribe either the nature of the administrative
7. Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Bd. of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq.
504, 179 Atl. 116 (1935).
9. Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 234 on Procedural Problems in the Administrative
Agencies Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Committee on the Jutdiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1960).
10. Vol. 1, § 7.06 at 430-31 & nn.6, 8.
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hearing or the type of review. It was the United States Supreme Court which
introduced the conception that judicial review would be generally limited to
the record made before the Commission, and that the Commission's deter-
mination should be based upon facts introduced in an open hearing similar to
a judicial proceeding, even though formal rules of evidence or procedure need
not prevail."1
This dual conception of limited judicial review based on a record developed
in the administrative hearing must be recognized as part of the theoretical
foundation of the trial-type hearing so prevalent in American administrative
law, particularly at the federal level, even in the absence of explicit statutory
requirements. Perhaps this explains why the Supreme Court had no hesitancy
in holding in Riss & Co. v. United States that a proceeding before the ICC for
issuance of a motor carrier certificate was "an adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing" with-
in the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, even though there is no
such requirement in the Interstate Commerce Act. 12 Whether or not such a
hearing was constitutionally required, as the Court may have meant to imply,
it is clear that the trial-type hearing characteristic of the rate-making and cer-
tificating functions of the major regulatory agencies, cannot substantially be
abandoned without reexamining the respective roles of administrative and
judicial determinations in the federal system. This does not necessarily mean
that the procedures for formulating the issues or establishing the facts might
not be significantly altered to suit best the functions being performed, within
the framework of a determination "on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing."
This brings us to another major theme of the Davis treatise-his argument
for "official notice" as a principal tool by which an administrative agency may
make appropriate use of its own accumulated knowledge and the technical
knowledge of its staff, without either evidentiary procedures or sacrifice of a
fair hearing. Here again Professor Davis relies heavily upon the distinction
between adjudicative and legislative facts; with respect to the latter, he argues
that liberal use of official notice is particularly desirable. Courts, he contends,
do not hesitate to examine any relevant published sources of information, to
rely upon their own experience or even to consult with acquaintances in order
to acquire the factual background needed for the intelligent resolution of con-
stitutional and other questions of law.13 Similarly he urges that administrative
11. See, e.g., ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
12. Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951), reversing 96 F. Supp. 452
(1950). The Court's per curiam opinion cited only Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33 (1950), which explicitly rested on the constitutional right to hearing in deporta-
tion cases, implied of necessity in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 50-51. The
question under the Interstate Commerce Act, when issuance of a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity is involved, is by no means so clear, as demonstrated by the lower
court's opinion. 96 F. Supp. 452.
13. The latter sources may be somewhat unusual-at least in explicit mention-al-
though Professor Davis, Vol. 2, § 15.03 n.26, cites the support of a delightful, but dissent-
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agencies should be free to use all available sources of information in exercising
their delegated law-making powers. But administrative agencies, unlike courts,
are frequently required by statute to exercise their law making powers upon a
factual record developed in an adversary proceeding. Thus it would be non-
sense for the ICC suddenly to announce that in prescribing rates for the future
it would resolve all relevant factual questions on the basis of official notice,
without any opportunity for rebuttal in a trial-type hearing. This Professor
Davis himself would be the first to recognize, since he urges that all fairly dis-
putable facts officially noticed should somehow be made a part of the record
and the parties given a fair opportunity to challenge them.
As a possible alternative to the more conventional evidentiary procedures
Professor Davis refers to the official notice practices of the Office of Price
Administration, which he suggests rested somewhat upon the legislative char-
acter of price and rent ceilings. They also had the sanction of the statutory
provision requiring the protestant to be informed "of any economic data and
other facts of which the Administrator has taken official notice." Yet funda-
mentally there was little difference between the prescription of price ceilings
for an entire industry and the prescription of rates for large segments of the
railroad industry. True, the Price Control Act allowed the Administrator to
issue regulations without prior formal hearing. But upon the filing of a protest
he was required to accord either a written or oral hearing,14 and denial of a
protest was reviewable in the Emergency Court of Appeals on the record made
in the administrative proceedings. In practice, in complex cases with difficult
factual issues, the Administrator, during the protest proceedings, announced
exactly what data had been officially noticed so that the protestant might offer
rebuttal evidence or even demand an oral hearing and cross-examination. It
was in short a determination "on the record after opportunity for agency hear-
ing." Probably most members of the ICC bar would be horrified at any sug-
gestion that the Commission procedures should even remotely resemble those
of the Office of Price Administration. And yet, with the increasing substitu-
tion of written for oral hearings, Commission practices have in effect been
moving in that direction.' 5 How far these tendencies may properly and profit-
ably be carried is the real question. Nevertheless, Professor Davis is undoubt-
edly on sound ground in urging that the Commission itself could be more hos-
pitable to the idea of official notice and more daring in its use.
As Professor Davis recognizes, there is a close connection between the prob-
lem of official notice and the problems of internal separation of functions, and
ing, opinion by Judge Frank, describing his investigation of feminine shopping practices.
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948). Another more
recent example is provided by the Supreme Court's own reference to factual information
supplied in the briefs of amici curiae in disposing of a question of agency discretion in tak-
ing cognizance of facts outside the record. Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 n.23, 81 Sup. Ct. 435, 450 n.23 (1961).
14. The procedures were generally described and sustained in Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944) and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
15. Vol. 2, § 14.16 at 331.
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the so-called institutional decision. When either the hearing examiner or the
agency head is making an intermediate or final decision, he may find some
issue of fact which is not adequately covered in the record. If the missing facts
can be supplied from the examiner's or commissioner's own personal informa-
tion, or from available agency records, only the problem of official notice is
presented. But if the deciding officer requires the help of staff specialists, then
we must take account of the various statutory provisions, procedural regula-
tions or conceptions of fair hearing which forbid secret consultation between
deciding officers and staff members in adversary or trial-type hearings. The
outstanding provision of general application is section 5(c) of the Adminis-
tration Procedure Act 16-- the so-called separation of functions provision, which
represents a carefully articulated compromise between strongly opposing points
of view, and like most such compromises, is not without ambiguities. Professor
Davis' attitude toward this provision, and various proposals for its amendment,
is complex and not easily summarized. Basically, section 5 (c) prohibits the pre-
siding officer in adjudicatory proceedings from consulting "with any person or
party on any fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to
participate." It also provides that no staff member engaged in investigatory or
prosecutory functions in any case shall participate in the decision or recom-
mended decision in that case or a factually related case except as witness or
counsel in public proceedings. This subsection is also made inapplicable to
initial licensing proceedings, to proceedings involving public utilities, and to
the heads of the agency. Professor Davis generally approves of this provision,
but doubts the wisdom of some of its qualifications. Thus, speaking of an in-
stance involving initial licensing before the FCC, where the Commission's Gen-
eral Counsel after acting as advocate in public proceedings before the Com-
mission also argued before it in execution session, in the absence of opposing
counsel, he says: "What was done was clearly a violation of sound principle
but just as clearly was not a violation of the APA, because the case involved
an application for an initial license."'17 His thought is that one who was an ad-
vocate in formal proceedings should not continue as advocate in private ses-
sions, whether the proceedings involve licensing, rate making, or the issuance
of a cease and desist order. On the other hand, he argues that deciding officers
should be encouraged to consult with agency specialists on technical questions
which trouble them in trying to arrive at their decision. Under the APA agency
heads may clearly so consult with specialists who have not participated in in-
vestigating or prosecuting. They should also be allowed, Davis argues, to con-
sult with experts who have testified, so long as any new analyses or advice pre-
sented is clearly reflected in the final opinion and adequate opportunity is
afforded for argument or rehearing. He would also extend this freedom of con-
sultation to hearing officers in preparing proposed decisions, on the theory that
the use of all the technical resources of the agency would make the report more
16. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1958).
17. Vol. 2, § 13.06 at 214.
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likely to reflect the ultimate thinking of the agency and give the private parties
a better opportunity to expose any weaknesses in such thinking.
Whether the separation principle-as represented by section 5(c)-should
be expanded or curtailed is a key question in the debate over "judicialization"
of the administrative process. The separation principle has been carried much
further in the creation of the independent office of General Counsel to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. It would be carried still further in the congres-
sional proposals, supported by the American Bar Association, for the creation
of a Labor Court in place of the Labor Board, and an Administrator and a
Trade Court in place of the FTC. But these enforcement agencies present
relatively simple separation problems as compared with those posed by pro-
posals for further separation of functions within such agencies as the ICC,
FCC, the FPC and the CAB. This is illustrated by the 1952 amendments to
the Communication Acts, which, besides extending the separation principle to
initial licensing by prohibiting staff members who participated in the presenta-
tion or preparation of any case from advising as to that case, also prohibited
any member of the Offices of the General Counsel, the Chief Engineer, the
Chief Accountant, and anyone else performing investigative or prosecutive
functions for the Commission, from participating, except as witness or counsel,
in any adjudication designated for hearing.1 8 These amendments in effect iso-
late both Commissioners and examiners from any extra-record consultation
with staff specialists, except that the Commissioners are allowed the help of a
review staff which might include such specialists. Professor Davis, as a staunch
defender of the institutional decision, criticizes these provisions on the grounds
(1) that they cut off even Commissioners from the assistance of responsible
staff members who have not had investigatory or prosecutory responsibilities
in the particular case; and (2) that they isolate examiners who might be ex-
pected to have even less experience than Commissioners, from the staff spe-
cialists.' 9 Although we might be somewhat skeptical of the latter assumption,
and although cause and effect in these matters is difficult to establish, the recent
history of the FCC clearly casts doubt on the wisdom of the amendments.
However this may be, the pressing issue now is whether internal isolation
of the decision maker should be carried still further, whether we should strug-
gle along with the present uneasy compromise, or whether some new approach
should be attempted. The American Bar Association has generally tended to-
ward the first alternative in its support of bills which would amend the APA.
This position has now gained the support of the House Special Subcommittee
on Legislative Oversight. In its controversial Final Report of January, 1961,20
the Subcommittee highlighted the probably routine approaches to the Federal
Power Commission of Thomas Corcoran, Washington lawyer, in connection
with a certification and rate proceeding then awaiting Commission decision
18. 66 Stat. 713, 721 (1952), 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(f), 155(c), 409(c) (1958).
19. Vol. 2, § 11.14 at 98-99.




after completion of the formal record. Mr. Corcoran had argued that his con-
duct was clearly permitted by the APA, and violated no general ethical prin-
ciples because it was above-board and did not affect adversary parties. The
majority of the Subcommittee wholeheartedly accepted almost all of Corcoran's
arguments. They agreed that since section 5 (c) permitted staff members free
access to the Commissioners, it was only fair that a similar privilege should be
accorded to private parties. They also agreed that this was a nonadversary
proceeding outside of the principle of the Sangamon Valley case,2 ' in which
the Court of Appeals vacated an FCC allocation of television channels between
communities because of ex parte communications by an interested station
owner. For good measure the majority of the Subcommittee added that such
ex parte conduct was not unusual, and was in fact encouraged by the Commis-
sion. "[T] he Commission in meeting emergencies and deadlines is acting in
the public interest by having ex parte contacts with industry representatives." 22
Despite these conclusions-labeled by the minority as an "incredible white-
wash" 23 the Subcommittee Report went on to recommend that section 5(c)
be amended to forbid staff members from communicating with Commissioners
concerning a case awaiting decision after oral argument, except that the Com-
mission could have a staff panel of experts to assist them in arriving at de-
cisions and writing opinions. Members of this staff could also be assigned to
a case in process of hearing, and could periodically report to a Commissioner
assigned to that case with regard to its progress, but would not participate in
it except as observers. These subcommittee conclusions and recommendations
illustrate a questionable assumption that internal separation of functions and
ex parte communications from private parties are necessarily opposite sides of
the same coin. But they also indicate an attempt to escape from results of this
assumption by the creation of another hierarchy of staff experts who may ob-
serve and report but who will not be contaminated by active participation.
This suggestion may reflect a suspicion that one difficulty of the formal de-
cision making process in complex regulatory proceedings is that the Commis-
sioners enter only at the final stage, after months or years of formulating issues
and developing facts at the staff level. Yet the proposal would only acquaint
one of the Commissioners with the general progress of the proceedings, and
this at the expense of assigning precious staff time to passive observation. The
practicability of this suggestion, to say nothing of the probable reactions it
would elicit from the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional Appropriations
Committees, is hardly promising. A serious attempt to implement the proposal
is more likely to result in the same kind of internal organization required of
the Communications Commission by the 1952 amendments.
A more radical solution than those discussed thus far has been Louis Hector's
plan for complete separation of the agencies' quasi-judicial functions from
21. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
22. H.R. REP. No. 2238, supra note 20, at 23.
23. Id. at 86.
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planning and policy making.24 Although he has made the suggestion explicit
only with regard to the CAB, he apparently means that any case to be deter-
mined on the record after opportunity for formal agency hearing, would neces-
sarily be transferred into the jurisdiction of an Administrative Court. In a
CAB case, the planning of route patterns would be the job of an Administrator
responsible to the President, perhaps as part of a Department of Transporta-
tion. An Administrative Court would award routes to particular airlines, sub-
ject to such general policy regulations as the Administrator might declare.
Mr. Hector did not wrestle explicitly with how rate regulation would be
handled under his set-up. Whatever the mechanics, he apparently envisages a
system which would allow the Administrator to act wholeheartedly as an ex-
ecutive with all the attendant informalities, and the Administrative Court to
act in a wholeheartedly judicial manner with no ex parte consultations except
those appropriate for judicial proceedings. Under the present setup, he says,
it is virtually impossible for the Administrator, in a quasi-judicial role to
divorce himself from the background and attitudes acquired through informal
contact with the industry.2 5
Perhaps Professor Davis would ask why the Administrator should even at-
tempt such a divorce. The original justification for the administrative commis-
sion was partly this very "expertise" developed from experience with the in-
dustry. Indeed, Mr. Hector's own description of the insights and outlook ac-
quired through a Commissioner's general regulatory experience suggests that
much would be lost if the Administrative Court came to the decision of con-
tested cases without any comparable background. In answer to this criticism,
Mr. Hector points to the separation between the Internal Revenue Service and
the Tax Court. Perhaps this minimizes the fact that both the Internal Revenue
Service and the Tax Court are concerned primarily with interpreting the tax
laws, rather than formulating tax policies. Thus the job of the Tax Court is
not to implement policies formulated by Internal Revenue, but to apply the tax
laws themselves to specific cases, giving such weight to the administrative in-
terpretations as would be given by any court.2 6
The most perplexing question suggested by Mr. Hector's memorandum is
why the regulatory agencies cannot exercise their policy making functions
properly without turning over their quasi-judicial functions to an Administra-
tive Court. For example, if the CAB, or a single Administrator acting in its
place, could develop policies sufficiently precise for the guidance of an Adminis-
trative Court in concrete cases, why could not the CAB do the same thing for
24. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
25. This view is also elaborated in Mr. Hector's testimony. Hearings, supra note 9,
at 207.
26. This too is an over-simplification since some Treasury Regulations may doubtless
more properly be classified as legislative rather than interpretative, but in general the dis-
tinction mentioned is still a valid one. See rrnKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATES & GiFt
TAXATION 27 (2d ed. 1958).
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the guidance of its examiners? The only difference, aside from the multi-headed
nature of the CAB, would be that the Board would retain some check on the
application of those policies through review of examiners' decisions. To some
extent the FCC, with no greater statutory authority, has done just this by
issuing regulations which are in effect the prior announcement of principles to
govern the disposition of applications for broadcasting licenses.2 7 The FCC
also adopted the policy of allocating television channels among different com-
munities in rule-making hearings before allocating particular channels among
competing applicants.28 This device has not solved all the problems of the FCC.
Indeed the ex parte communications problem of the Sangamon Valley case,
arose in just such a rule-making proceeding which was treated as an adver-
sary proceeding. But such problems would be presented irrespective of whether
an Administrator or a Board was doing the allocating. Also, complete separa-
tion of route patterns for air service from the choice of the particular airlines
may itself be impracticable because the relative strengths of the airlines are
relevant in determining such patterns.29 But whatever the difficulties inherent
in the problem, the development of such plans should be just as feasible for a
Board as for an Administrator, allowing for the likelihood of greater delay and
deliberateness on account of the multiheaded character of the Board. If a sub-
stantial part of the problem is the simple pressure of the work load, then per-
haps the decision making process should be delegated in relatively unimportant
cases to examiners or intermediate boards, as exemplified in the recent reor-
ganization of the ICC.30
It is interesting to compare Mr. Hector's proposal with the reactions of
Dean Landis to CAB procedures shortly after his service as its Chairman.
Landis felt that both the routes to be flown and the carriers to fly them should
be determined by informal study and investigation, out of which the Board
would evolve a comprehensive plan allocating routes among various carriers.31
Such a procedure could probably not be adopted without substantial amend-
ment of the Civil Aeronautics Act, which now requires that certificates should
be issued only upon application after public hearing. Even if the Act were
amended to provide explicitly for issuance of certificates in accordance with
comprehensive plans drawn by the Board after general investigations, the con-
stitutional question of whether applications by particular carriers for particular
27. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
28. This procedure was sustained in Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States,
210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
29. See Auerbach, Some Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, 1960 Wis. L. REv.
183, 186.
30. 26 Fed. Reg. 241, 861, 1378 (1961). This possibility is further emphasized in the
President's message of April 14, 1961. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1961, p. 12, cols. 5-6.
31. Landis, Air Routes Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. AIm L. & Com. 295,
299, 301 (1948). In his report to Mr. Kennedy, Dean Landis seems ready to settle for a
less radical change in CAB procedures. See LANDIS REPORT 42.
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routes could be denied without trial-type hearings would remain. This rein-
troduces the question discussed at the outset-when a trial-type hearing is
constitutionally required-and also the implications of the Supreme Court's
per curiam decision in the Riss case. If this decision means that a certificate
may not be constitutionally denied without a trial-type hearing on the record
it would also seem to mean that all issues relevant to the decision cannot be
conclusively determined beforehand by informal investigation. On the other
hand, the Riss case may mean that the trial-type hearing was implicit in the
scheme of the Interstate Commerce Act, with judicial review limited to the
administrative record. If so, it is conceivable that route allocations could be
made in informal rule-making proceedings, leaving the administrative deter-
minations challengeable in de novo judicial proceedings. In view of the mutual
interests of both the agencies and the federal courts in avoiding such proceed-
ings whenever possible, this seems an unlikely alternative either in the case of
the CAB or the other major regulatory agencies.
More fruitful possibilities may lie in the development of composite proce-
dures permitting the agencies to conduct general studies and investigations
leading to the formulation of proposed plans, orders or regulations which
would then serve as the basis for formal, trial-type hearings. For such a sys-
tem to work effectively agency heads would have to be fully responsible for,
and thoroughly familiar with, the preliminary investigation and planning stage,
and would of course have to be free to consult extensively with their most
responsible staff members. It would be indeed unfortunate if hasty reactions to
the ex parte communications problem and uncritical extensions of the principle
of internal separation of functions were to prevent the evolution of such com-
posite procedures. One of the great virtues of the administrative process has
supposedly been its flexibility. Now that it has so clearly come of age, it should
not be forced to suffer prematurely from hardening of the arteries.32
NATHANIEL L. NATHANSONt
32. At this writing the latest developments in the re-examination of federal adminis-
trative procedures are the Executive Order of April 13, 1961, establishing an Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States (26 Fed. Reg. 3233), and the Report of April 14,
1961 of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, S.R. No. 168, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. The Subcommittee does not
recommend a general revision of the Administrative Procedure Act, but does make a num-
ber of particular recommendations, including the establishment of a White House Office
of Administration and Reorganization, and also a continuing Conference on Administrative
Procedure.
tProfessor of Law, Northwestern University.
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